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Introduction  
 
In little over a decade the practices of counter-terrorism have undergone significant reform. 
Central to this development is the UK PREVENT programme which has reconfigured 
                                                 
1 Corresponding Author Contact: Paul Dresser, Department of Criminology, University of Sunderland, 
Sunderland, SR6 0DD. Email: paul.dresser@sunderland.ac.uk, social media (Twitter): @DrPaulDresser 
Abstract 
The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (CTSA) mandates specified authorities 
to demonstrate due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into 
terrorism; what is better known as the ‘PREVENT Duty’. As part of this duty, 
public sector workers are required to identify a person’s proclivity for 
radicalisation, and, in turn, report concerns as a safeguarding measure. Drawing 
upon Rose and Miller’s matrix of political analysis, this article explores the 
PREVENT Duty through three theoretical areas: political rationalities; 
problematisations; and technologies of government. Framing the CTSA as a 
political rationality helps conceptualise the justifications and exercise of power in 
and between diverse authorities. Central to this is the way problematisations of 
risks connect to forms of knowledge, practices and technologies which become 
reproblematised and (de)politicised to create (un)stable assemblages of 
(in)security. The utility of governmental technologies helps situate PREVENT as 
it permeates the actuarial practices of mundane social care environments. Related 
to this, I draw attention to the governance of PREVENT which, I argue, is realised 
discursively through language. Through these theoretical frameworks I explore 
PREVENT as having undergone a process of rectification; this entails the 
mutation of PREVENT towards safeguarding. At a broader level, this article 
contributes to a reconstituted understanding of PREVENT by examining the 
intertwining of social care structures and counter-radicalisation. 
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counter-terrorism towards visible and overt counter-radicalisation methods. PREVENT is 
broadly defined as ‘a multi-disciplinary, cross departmental strand of the government’s 
CONTEST strategy intended to provide a holistic response to the full spectrum of terrorist 
risks and threats’ (Innes et al., 2011: 11). In exploring PREVENT, academics have situated 
counter-radicalisation as a deployment of anticipatory security through the identification of ‘at 
risk’ individuals.2 ‘At risk’ individuals occupy a non-criminal space but are nevertheless 
considered vulnerable to extremism. The conceptual underpinning of PREVENT is thus 
temporally pre-emptive; as the PREVENT strategy makes clear: ‘they (programmes to 
support at risk individuals) should pre-empt and not facilitate law enforcement activity’ (HM 
Government, 2011a: 8; adapted by present author). To this end, PREVENT involves security 
agents, multi-agency partnerships, and the lay public; hence, the reframing of PREVENT as a 
whole-of-society approach.   
While PREVENT has been central to counter-terrorism since its original iteration in 
2006, of particular interest to this article is section 26(1) of the Counter-Terrorism and 
Security Act (2015; [CTSA hereafter]). The CTSA imposed a legal requirement on certain 
bodies (‘specified authorities’ set out under Schedule 6 of the CTSA) to demonstrate, inter 
alia, ‘due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’ (HM 
Government, 2015b: 2); better known as the ‘PREVENT Duty’.3 The term ‘due regard’ means 
public sector workers are required to ‘demonstrate an awareness and understanding of the risk 
of radicalisation in the area, institution or body’ (HM Government, 2015b: 2).4 This includes 
identifying a person’s proclivity for extremist ideologies and, in turn, report concerns. It is 
pertinent to note that within this framework PREVENT is contextualised as a pre-existing 
safeguarding measure (see HM Government, 2015b). As a governing intervention, 
                                                 
2 See Aradua, et al., (2008); Ashworth and Zedner (2014); Baker-Beall et al., (2014); Heath-Kelly 
(2012, 2013); Lindekilde (2013); Martin (2014); Mythen et al., (2013); Pantazis and Pemberton 
(2009). 
3 Throughout this paper reference to HM Government (2015a and b) highlights statutory advice as part 
of legislation, whereas reference to the DfE, for example, reflects non-statutory guidance.   
4 Detailed guidance is issued under section 29 of the CTSA.  
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safeguarding5 is the processes of protecting vulnerable individuals with care and support 
needs, as well as minimising harms and abuses such as domestic violence, and forced 
marriage. Departmental Advice for Schools and Childcare Providers captures this (re)framing 
of PREVENT: 
‘Protecting children from the risk of radicalisation should be seen as part of 
schools’ and childcare providers’ wider safeguarding duties, and is similar in 
nature to protecting children from other harms (e.g. drugs, gangs, neglect, 
sexual exploitation), whether these come from within their family or are the 
product of outside influence’ (Department for Education [DfE hereafter], 2015: 
5).  
This article explores PREVENT with a particular focus on the CTSA. As a caveat, this article 
does not critically consider the ethical implications of PREVENT(ing) through safeguarding, 
or the shifting mechanics of suspicion. Coppock and McGovern, for instance, argue 
normalised technologies employed in counter-radicalisation strategies aimed at safeguarding 
vulnerable individuals are ‘underpinned by essentialised and racialised constructions of 
“childhood vulnerability” and bolstered by pseudo-scientific psychology of radicalisation 
discourse’ (2014: 252). Nor does this article explore criticisms associated with internal 
practices of spying and ‘Othersing’ practices of surveillance (see Kundnani, 2009; Durodie, 
2016).6 Whilst I acknowledge security discourses can produce a ‘complex gendered and 
racialised architecture of abnormality and pathology’ (Campbell, 1992: 94 cited in Aradua 
and Blanke, 2018: 5), an analysis of such does not formulate the context to this article.7  
                                                 
5 The concept of safeguarding significantly pre-dates the CTSA. Various pieces of legislation and 
guidance are relevant including: the 1989 Children Act; the National Health Services’ (NHS hereafter) 
‘No Secrets’ document; and the 2014 Care Act.   
6 The CTSA has been the focus of much media attention and public debate, with concerns raised 
around PREVENT exacerbating a ‘chilling effect’ on open discussion, free speech and political dissent   
(see Dudenhoefer, 2018). Writing about contemporary education, Durodie (2016) frames PREVENT 
as a securitising effort. 
7 See Dudenhoefer (2018) for an analysis of the PREVENT Duty in the context of ‘safe spaces’. 
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This article presents an alternative reading of counter-radicalisation as ‘safeguarding’ 
given research has been less attentive to theoretically unpacking this epistemic shift. To 
situate the argument within a wider context, I begin by outlining the UK PREVENT strategy, 
including the aims and objectives of PREVENT. Second, I document the implementation of 
the CTSA with the reconfiguration of PREVENT as ‘safeguarding’ providing a contextual 
framework. Of note, a more thorough, historical examination of PREVENT is beyond the 
boundaries of this article. The following sections explore Rose and Miller’s political analysis 
within the oeuvre of Foucault’s ‘governmentality’. In its broadest sense, governmentality 
encompasses:  
‘Institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that 
allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the 
population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and 
apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument’ (Foucault, 2007: 
144).  
Analysing the problematics of government, Rose and Miller (1992) outline two primary areas 
of political analysis: political rationalities, and technologies of government.8 The former 
entails the ‘changing discursive fields within which the exercise of power is conceptualised, 
the moral justifications for particular ways of exercising power by diverse authorities’ (Rose 
and Miller, 1992: 273). The notion of political rationality lends support to the ways in which 
problematisations of risks9 and threats connect to certain forms of knowledge, practices, 
technologies, and affects, to create (un)stable assemblages of (in)security (Wichum, 2013: 
164; emphasis added). Thereafter, I introduce the concept of ‘problematisation’; that is, ‘how 
problems come to be defined ... in relation to particular schemes of thought, diagnosis of 
                                                 
8 In a different vein, Elshimi (2015, 2017) provides a novel analysis of deradicalisation framed as 
‘technologies of the self’. 
9 I am following Rose’s description of risk as ‘a family of ways of thinking and acting, involving 
calculations about probable futures in the present followed by interventions into the present in order to 
control that potential future’ (2001: 7).  
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deficiency and promises of improvement’ (Li, 2007: 264).10 Central to this is the construction 
of knowledge which is rendered technical and depoliticised; how alliances are forged; and 
how problems become ‘reproblematised’ (de Goede and Simon, 2013: 319).  
While political rationalities are said to be the rules which regulate autonomous 
systems of meaning making (Wittendorp, 2016), governmental technologies are the means of 
realising rationalities. Rose and Miller conceptualise governmental technologies as the 
‘complex of mundane programmes, calculations, techniques, apparatuses, documents and 
procedures through which authorities seek to embody and give effect to governmental 
ambitions’ (1992: 273). In the final section I explore the governance of PREVENT theorised 
as a technology of government within mundane spaces of everydayness; this, I argue, is 
realised discursively (and operationally) through language. 
I draw connections between these dimensions to posit a conceptual matrix of political 
analysis constitutes the ontological conditions which redefine PREVENT as safeguarding. 
Moreover, the oscillation between these dimensions allows for a systematic understanding of 
PREVENT as ‘interventions in the present in order to control potential future(s)’ (Rose, 2001: 
7; adapted by present author). In proffering such arguments, this article reframes PREVENT 
through theoretical means. Readers are therefore encouraged to interpret the arguments in 
ways which allow further analytical arguments and/or debates to emerge. At a broader level, 
this article provides a reconstituted understanding of the non-criminal space by exploring the 
intertwining of social care structures and counter-radicalisation. 
 
Preventing Terrorism in the UK: What is PREVENT?   
 
The PREVENT programme was operationalised in 2006 as part of the cross-government 
counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST – the UK counter-terrorism strategy implemented in 
response to an emerging domestic (and international) terrorist threat following the 2005 
                                                 
10 In Foucault’s terms, problematising is ‘the development of a domain of acts, practices, and thoughts 
that pose problems for politics’ (1984:  384, adapted by present author). 
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London Bombings (Omand 2010). CONTEST encompasses four strands: PREVENT, 
PURSUE, PROTECT and PREPARE. The objective of PREPARE is to mitigate the effects of 
attacks, rapidly bringing any attack to an end, and recovering from it (HM government, 
2018a); PROTECT strengthens the national border infrastructure of counter-terrorism 
capabilities to attack (HM Government, 2009); PURSUE disrupts terrorist threats through 
targeting known suspects thus coinciding with traditional forms of ‘top-down’ intelligence 
gathering; finally, PREVENT is said to be more forward-facing. While the other three stands 
of CONTEST entail clandestine and covert counter-terrorism methods, PREVENT includes 
‘bottom-up’ approaches and ‘soft power’ prevention (Nye, 2004). In a governance sense, 
PREVENT encompasses ‘processes of horizontal decision-making and collaborative modes of 
governing between public, private, voluntary and community actors’ (Griggs et al., 2014: 2). 
Following parliamentary review in June 2011, PREVENT was revised along an axis of 
three overarching (yet interrelated) objectives: to respond to the ideological challenge of 
terrorism; to provide support and practical help to prevent individuals from being drawn into 
terrorism; and to work with a wide range of institutions where there are risks of radicalisation 
or which support counter-radicalisation work (HM Government, 2011a). In contrast to the 
original iteration of PREVENT which was centred on Islamic terrorists (HM Government, 
2006), the realigned PREVENT objectives are said to address all types of terrorism, though 
the PREVENT strategy makes clear the greatest risk to the UK is that of al Qaeda-related 
terrorism (HM Government, 2011b: 59, 6). The latest version of CONTEST (CONTEST3 
hereafter) further highlights the increased threat from the rise of Daesh,11 as well as growing 
threat of right-wing terrorism both to British citizens and interests overseas (HM Government, 
2018a).  
Turley (2009) outlines the aforementioned objectives are supported by strategic 
enablers that centre around three types of activity: counter-radicalisation; community 
cohesion building; and deradicalisation. Counter-radicalisation focuses on inhibiting the 
                                                 
11 Interchangeably known as Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL), Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS), and Islamic State (IS).  
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spread of extremist ideas. As a cross-community effort, community cohesion building is said 
to increase the resilience of communities to extremist ideologies. Research which explores 
resilience as multi-dimensional, and as collective endeavour encompassing social structures, 
community processes and practices provides a more fruitful understanding of this aspect of 
PREVENT (see c.f. Norris et al., 2008). Finally, deradicalisation compromises targeted 
interventions with individuals whom, while occupying a non-criminal space, are considered 
‘at risk’ of adopting extremist ideologies (or have already done so) (Vidino and Brandon, 
2012).  
The police-run CHANNEL programme (considered an extension of PREVENT) 
embodies the core instrument of deradicalisation through a multi-agency risk assessment and 
case management system, itself ‘modelled on other successful multi-agency risk management 
processes, such as child protection, domestic violence and the management of high risk 
offenders; it uses processes which also safeguard people at risk from crime, drugs or gangs’ 
(HM Government, 2011a: 57).12 Through targeted support, CHANNEL attempts to ‘dissuade 
individuals from engaging in and supporting terrorist-related activity’ (HM Government, 
2011a: 56), as well as reducing the influence of extremist ideas where they have gained 
traction by ‘removing people from the influence of and contract from with terrorist groups 
and sympathises’ (HM Government, 2011a: 56). CHANNEL is also concerned with ensuring 
behavioural changes through other types of support such as life skills, family support contact, 
and careers contact (see HM Government, 2012c, 2018b). In fact, in 2016/17, statistics 
demonstrate 45% of individuals referred through PREVENT were signposted to alternative 
services for support (HM Government, 2018b). 
Those considered ‘vulnerable to extremism’ are assessed across three dimensions: 
‘engagement with a group, cause or ideology’ (‘psychological hooks’); ‘intent to cause harm’ 
(‘intent factors’); and ‘capability to cause harm’ (‘capability factors’; HM Government, 
                                                 
12 CHANNEL has been extended and is now firmly embedded within formal children’s 
‘safeguarding’ protocols and practices (HM Government, 2012a). The Home Office is also 
piloting a new approach to embed common safeguarding procedures through local authorities 
taking a more active role (HM Government, 2018a).   
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2012b: 11). Each of these dimensions contain a number of ‘vulnerability indicators’ including 
(though not limited to): ‘expressed opinions’, ‘material indicators’, and ‘behaviour and 
behavioural change(s)’ (McGready, 2011). Foregrounding several dispositions of behaviour 
that serve as proxy indicators of risk reflects the performativity of PREVENT. The conceptual 
underpinning of counter- and deradicalisation strategies is therefore anticipatory and 
temporally pre-emptive given the focus on individuals that are considered vulnerable to 
extremism within a non-criminal space. 
This discursive shift towards pre-crime vulnerability cannot be understood outside a 
discourse of radicalisation. Following the London bombings of July 7 (2005), UK counter-
terrorism was re-orientated from foreign policy and border control, and become enmeshed 
within a domestic realm (Regazzi, 2016). Preventing Violent Extremsim (PVE) emerged as a 
capacity building effort through the diffusion of formal responsibilities towards local 
authorities. Irrespective of compatibility, from 2006-2011, PREVENT was deployed through 
The Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG) which was required to 
strengthen community resilience and address radicalisation at local level. This was supported 
by National Indicator 35 (NI35 hereafter) which measured a local authority’s, inter alia: 
‘understanding of, and engagement with, Muslim communities’ (Association of Police 
Authorities 2009: 35). Whether an area adopted NI35 as a performance measure, or 
radicalisation concern(s) had been identified, local areas were required to report regardless.  
The devolution of governance towards civil society groups was further consolidated 
through a policy discourse of community cohesion which pre-dates the London bombings of 
2005. The 2001 riots in former industrial towns across Lancashire and Yorkshire were 
attributed to neighbourliness communities underpinned by polarisation, ontological insecurity, 
and the rejection of racialised coding of British civic and public culture by young Asian men 
of second and third generations. Hence the problematising forms of spatial social imaginary in 
and between communities. What emerged was a narrative of integration and civic identity 
intertwined with a discourse of radicalisation. While radicalisation is a nebulous and contested 
term, the PREVENT strategy defines radicalisation ‘as the process by which a person comes 
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to support terrorism and forms of extremism leading to terrorism’ (HM Government, 2011a: 
3). PREVENT also addresses non-violent extremism which can ‘create an atmosphere 
conducive to terrorism and can popularise views which terrorists then exploit’ (HM 
Government, 2011a: 3). Extremism, on the other hand, is defined as vocal or active opposition 
to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and 
mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs’ (HM Government, 2013: 2). This 
includes ‘calls for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or 
overseas’ (HM Government, 2013: 2). CONTEST3 frames extremism as narratives which run 
contrary to ‘the values of our society’ (HM Government, 2018a: 78) whilst concomitantly 
emphasising the need to promote ‘pluralistic British values’ (HM Government, 2018a: 78). 
This demonstrates a seemingly slight, yet significant lexical shift. 
 
The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (2015) 
 
The introduction of the CTSA in July 2015 imposed the ‘PREVENT Duty’ - a legal 
requirement on specified authorities to demonstrate due regard to the need to prevent people 
from being drawn into terrorism. Specified authorities are set out under Schedule 6 of the 
CTSA; these include: local authorities; education bodies; health and social care bodies; prison 
and probation authorities; and the police. These authorities are now ‘subject to provisions’ 
when they ‘consider all the other factors relevant to how they carry out their usual functions’ 
(HM Government, 2015b: 2). Accordingly, the CTSA does not confer ‘new functions on any 
specified authority’ (HM Government, 2015b: 2); rather, it is expected that the PREVENT 
Duty is incorporated into ‘existing policies and procedures, so it becomes part of the day-to-
day work of the authority’ (HM Government 2015b: 6). It is further stated those in leadership 
positions (within specified authorities) must ‘establish or use existing mechanisms for 
understanding the risk of radicalisation’ and ‘ensure staff understand the risk and build the 
capabilities to deal with it’ (HM Government 2015b: 3). In the context of the DfE, revised 
guidance outlines the PREVENT Duty attaches to the governors and/or proprietors of schools 
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and colleges, and not to the individuals that work in them (HM Government, 2015a). 
However, practitioners - whatever the authority or institution - are implicated by the duty 
given the need to ‘demonstrate an awareness and understanding of the risk of radicalisation in 
the area, institution or body’ (HM Government, 2015b: 2). As advice from the National Union 
of Teachers (NUT hereafter) explains, ‘teachers are likely to be subject to an express or 
implied contractual obligation to take such steps as the school or college deems necessary to 
meet its statutory duty’ (NUT, 2015: 6).  
While the CTSA was said to be fast-tracked though Parliament (House of Lords, 
2015), it is important not to assume the articulation of the duty only relates to the CTSA. An 
obligation to prevent radicalisation was already being enforced in schools and colleges via 
Ofsted through its Common Inspection Framework which pre-dates the CTSA (see Miah, 
2017). This followed two high-profile incidents: the ‘trojan horse’ affair; and the 
downgrading of a London school’s Ofsted rating due a lack of safeguarding policies in 
relation to PREVENT. A sector-wide counter-radicalisation response is also evidenced by e-
Learning PREVENT packages, and Workshops to Raise Awareness of PREVENT (WRAP 
hereafter). Developed by the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSTC), WRAP has 
been operational since 2011. The overarching aim of WRAP is to provide workers from the 
education sector, health institutions, youth organisations, local authorities, community groups, 
etc., with an understanding of ‘how and why various partners might signal concerns around 
polarisation and radicalisation’ (Dresser, 2015: 172). This entails one-day training sessions 
which, at the time of writing, have been completed over one million times (HM Government, 
2018a).13  
What is particularly apposite to the CTSA is a legislative reframing of PREVENT 
within a rubric of safeguarding.14 The Home Office has urged professional practitioners to 
think of the PREVENT duty (and the ways in which risk is understood and responded to) as 
‘an addition to existing safeguarding responsibilities’ (Busher et al., 2017: 9). Under a pre-
                                                 
13 This figure relates to both e-Learning packages and one-day WRAP training.   
14 The revised PREVENT strategy (2011) introduced counter-radicalisation as a safeguarding 
endeavour, whereas the CTSA legislatively consolidated this approach.   
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existing safeguarding apparatus, the CTSA responsibilises practitioners from the public sector 
to identify ‘at risk’ individuals’ proclivity for radicalisation and, in turn, raise concerns to 
their line manager or Designated Safeguarding Lead. In relation to the education sector, 
Designated Safeguarding Leads undertake PREVENT awareness training and are said to 
provide advice and support to other members of staff on protecting individuals from the risk 
of radicalisation (DfE, 2015: 7).  
Yet there is more to the CTSA. Alongside a safeguarding approach, the CTSA frames 
the PREVENT Duty as resilience building against extremist ideologies. The DfE and the 
Home Office, for example, jointly developed Educate Against Hate - a website designed to 
protect children from extremist influences online, as well as providing educationalists with 
‘the guidance and support they need to protect children from radicalisation and extremism’ 
(HM Government, 2018a: 37). More pertinently, schools and colleges are statutorily required 
to actively promote fundamental British values within curriculum content and delivery.15 
Various guidelines have been developed to help teachers develop a curriculum response 
which incorporates the active promotion of British values (see, for example, Expert Subject 
Advisory Group for Citizenship, 2015). This has been the subject of much polarised debate, 
not least because of an interplay between a statutory requirement to identify vulnerable 
individuals through robust safeguarding policies, alongside a commitment to encourage 
positive social narratives which helps civic and political participation. Under section 29 of the 
CTSA, schools and colleges are said to be ‘safe spaces’ in which children and young people 
can ‘understand and discuss sensitive topics, including terrorism and extremist ideas that are 
part of terrorist ideology, and learn how to challenge these ideas’ (HM Government, 2015b: 
14). This is said to satisfy the need to protect freedom of speech under section 31 of the CTSA 
(HM Government 2015a) thus adhering to section 43(1) of the Education (No. 2) Act, 1986. 
Within a higher education context, governing bodies or qualifying institutions must also 
demonstrate regard to the importance of academic freedom (HM Government, 2015a) referred 
to in section 202(2)(a) of the Education Reform Act, 1988. 
                                                 
15 Promoting British values has been part of counter-radicalisation since 2011.  
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Coupling vulnerability to radicalisation with a responsibility to safeguard ‘at risk’ individuals 
provides an overarching protectionist agenda which reconfigures the would-be-terrorist 
through a discourse of victimhood. The DfE’s Departmental Advice for Schools and 
Childcare Providers makes this clear: 
‘Protecting children from the risk of radicalisation should be seen as part of 
schools’ and childcare providers’ wider safeguarding duties, and is similar in 
nature to protecting children from other harms (e.g. drugs, gangs, neglect, 
sexual exploitation), whether these come from within their family or are the 
product of outside influence’ (DfE, 2015: 5). 
As part of this logic, the CTSA embodies an evacuation of pre-fixed, linear profiling that is 
reflective of previous iterations of PREVENT. Public sector workers are encouraged to use 
their ‘professional judgement’ (DfE, 2015: 6; Dresser, 2015) in identifying individuals who 
might be at risk of radicalisation and act proportionately’ (DfE, 2015: 6, adapted by present 
author). The nature of professional judgement is intertwined with already existing expertise in 
safeguarding risks (Heath-Kelly, 2017). Where safeguarding concerns have been identified 
relating to PREVENT, these are referred to the local authority who assess whether or not to 
forward the case to the local Prevent CHANNEL panel (itself chaired by local authorities and 
multi-agency in nature). The referral evidence is then examined and a decision is made 
whether an individual has reached a threshold for anti-radicalisation mentoring (amongst a 
myriad of other support processes), before a bespoke intervention package is devised.   
To fully comply with the PREVENT Duty, specified authorities must evidence 
productive co-operation with Local PREVENT co-ordinators, the police and local authorities 
(HM Government, 2015b: 4);16 hence the framing of PREVENT as a ‘collective 
responsibility’ (HM Government, 2011a: 44). Specified authorities must further demonstrate 
                                                 
16 Local PREVENT co-ordinators are employed by local authorities in government-defined priority 
areas. Partnership work will naturally be more difficult in non-priority PREVENT areas due to 
funding restraint (see Dresser, 2018).   
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‘co-ordination through multi-agency forums, for example Community Safety Partnerships’ 
(HM Government, 2015b: 4), as made clear in DfE advice:  
‘The PREVENT Duty builds on existing local partnership arrangements. Local 
Safeguarding Children Boards (LSCBs) are responsible for co-ordinating what 
is done by local agencies for the purposes of safeguarding and promoting the 
welfare of children in their local area. Safeguarding arrangements should 
already take into account the policies and procedures of the LSCB. For 
example, LSCBs publish threshold guidance indicating when a child or young 
person might be referred for support’ (DfE, 2015: 7). 
Finally, the Home Office oversee and centrally monitor the PREVENT Duty (this applies to 
up to 50 priority PREVENT areas). Amongst other responsibilities, the Home Office ‘draw 
together data about implementation of PREVENT from local and regional PREVENT co-
ordinators (including those in health, further and higher education), the police, intelligence 
agencies and other departments’ (HM Government, 2015b: 5). Where any specified authority 
has failed to execute its PREVENT Duty, section 32(A) of the CTSA allows the Secretary of 
State to enforce the performance of PREVENT.     
This section has explored the reconfiguration of PREVENT as safeguarding. There has 
been a focus on the implementation of CTSA which mandates public sector workers to 
demonstrate ‘due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’ (HM 
Government, 2015b: 2). As part of this duty, PREVENT is legislatively framed as a pre-
existing safeguarding measure similar to broader types of preventable abuse. The article now 
turns to unpacking this transition using Rose and Miller’s political analysis as a theoretical 
frame. The following sections are separated into three areas of analysis: ‘political rationality’; 
‘problematisations’; and ‘technologies of government’. 
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PREVENT as Safeguarding: Political Rationality 
 
We begin to understand the reconfiguration of PREVENT as safeguarding through a 
conceptual lens of ‘political rationality’. Political rationality refers to a ‘discursive field within 
which the exercise of power is conceptualised,’ which combines ‘justifications for particular 
ways of exercising power by diverse authorities’ with ‘notions of the appropriate forms, 
objects, and limits of politics, and conceptions of the proper distribution of such tasks’ (Rose 
and Miller, 1992: 175). To be clear, in elucidating PREVENT as a political rationality I am 
not merely drawing reference to discourse(s) embedded public pronouncements by 
government actors; rather, the focus is upon ‘discourses found in technical policy papers that 
deal with governance in a programmatic manner’ (Merlingen, 2011: 152).  
On this argument, Rose and Miller outline political rationalities have an 
‘epistemological’ character relating to the nature of the object or persons governed i.e. 
society, the nation, the population, the economy (1992: 227). Drawing upon Paul Veyne, they 
point out, ‘these can be specified as members of a flock to be led, legal subjects with rights, 
children to be educated, a resource to be exploited, elements of a population to be managed’ 
(Rose and Miller, 1992: 277, italics in original). The epistemological character of PREVENT 
is consolidated through an imaginative shift which reconfigures vulnerability to radicalisation 
as ideological abuse which pre-figures terrorism. This, essentially, situates the would-be-
terrorist through a discourse of ‘victimhood’ (Heath-Kelly, 2017). As CONTEST3 makes 
clear: ‘safeguarding is at the heart of PREVENT’; this ensures ‘our communities and families 
are not exploited or groomed into following a path of violent extremism’ (HM Government, 
2018a: 10). Furthermore, alongside a safeguarding response, the PREVENT Duty is geared 
towards building resilience against extremism and thus, the development of critical stances 
and strategies to resist extremist messages. In an educational context, building pupils’ 
resilience is said to ‘promote pupils’ welfare’17 (DfE, 2015: 5) as part of ‘broader 
                                                 
17 I also acknowledge the converse argument regarding a shift from welfarism to a security-orientated 
practice.  
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requirements relating to the quality of education and to promoting the spiritual, moral, social 
and cultural development of pupils’ (HM Government, 2015b: 10). Within this, the 
Independent Schools Standards obligates schools and colleges to promote fundamental British 
values within curriculum content and delivery. This, inevitably, implicates individuals 
Kennelly (2010) terms ‘citizens-in-development’ (and thus requiring management). 
CHANNEL is instructive here. While CHANNEL is not exclusively geared towards 
safeguarding children and young people from radicalisation and/or extremism, statistics 
relating to individuals referred to and supported through PREVENT demonstrate those aged 
20 and under as the largest demographic (see HM Government, 2017 and 2018b). Of the 
7,631 individuals referred in 2015-16, the majority (4,274; 56%) were aged 20 years or under 
(HM Government, 2017). There was a marginal increase in 2016-17 with 3,487 individuals 
aged 20 years or under referred, making up 57% of referrals overall (HM Government, 
2018b). Home Office statistics also demonstrate that in 2015-16, those aged 20 years or under 
were the largest cohort discussed for appropriateness of CHANNEL intervention at 
CHANNEL Panel meetings (HM Government, 2017). This trend continued in 2016-17; of the 
1,146 individuals discussed at a CHANNEL panel, those aged 20 years of under made up the 
majority (697; 61%), while 332 individuals aged 20 years or under received CHANNEL 
support (226; 68%; HM Government, 2018b).  
At this point it is important to reiterate that deradicalisation does not only entail 
theological and/or ideological mentoring; CHANNEL is as much concerned with citizens’ 
welfare through, for example, careers advice; education skills contact; constructive pursuits; 
and housing support (see HM Government, 2012c, 2018b). This maps well to Rose and 
Miller’s characterisation of political rationality which considers welfarism ‘through the 
promotion of social responsibility and the mutuality of social risk’ (1992: 290). While 
welfarism is considered a responsibilising mode of government, importantly, the governing 
networks of welfare are not a coherent mechanism that enables the unfolding of a central plan 
but an assemblage of diverse and antagonistic components (Rose and Miller, 1992). Power in 
this sense is not monolithic nor does it emanate from a ‘centralised point’ (Foucault, 2003: 
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266-77). For Rose and Miller, the governing networks of welfare were not a state apparatus 
but ‘a composition of fragile and mobile relationships and dependencies making diverse 
attempts to link the aspirations of authorities with the lives of individuals. Assembling and 
maintaining such networks entailed struggles’ (1992: 290). This reflects Foucault’s inexorable 
turn to seeing power as diffused, decentralised, and arranged in microphysical relations (Cote, 
2007). Eschewing the concept of power as a single centre, Foucault exhorted that the juridical 
model of sovereignty be abandoned, instead emphasising the need to study the micro-diversity 
of power.18  
Likewise, while the CTSA responsibilises specified authorities for counter-
radicalisation, legislatively reconfiguring PREVENT as dispersed and multi-layered brings 
with it sites of resistance, dogmatism and fracture (c.f. Fussey, 2013; O’ Toole et al., 2016; 
Thomas, 2017; Dresser, 2015, 2018). For instance, in March 2016, the NUT voted 
overwhelming to reject the PREVENT strategy as part of Ofsted inspection.19 Furthermore, 
commenting on a lack of trust between the NHS and the police, the former Metropolitan 
Police’s Assistant Commissioner for Specialist Operations and Head of National Counter 
Terror Policy, Mark Rowley, stressed: ‘we have to work together, and it requires a bit more 
trust and collaboration between us’ (Knapton, 2017: 1). These observations are not entirely 
novel; as the PREVENT strategy outlines: ‘we are concerned that some universities and 
colleges have failed to engage in PREVENT. This lack of engagement must be addressed’ 
(HM Government, 2011a: 75-76).  
How structure and agency operate and relate in a non-criminal space is thus 
analytically important. This challenges McDonald and Hunter who frame PREVENT as ‘an 
elaborate network of agents, agencies, and procedures who engaged in practice of security, 
melded together in joint pursuit of each other’s interests’ (2013: 128; adapted by present 
author). The wide array of institutions responsibilised through the CTSA have far more 
                                                 
18 And, indeed, the study of localised, strategic systems.  
19 The Royal College of Psychiatrists have also expressed concern of PREVENT (see Royal College of 
Psychiatrists, 2016).  
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historical depth than the notion of “node” or “point” - as connoted by network – suggests.20 A 
more nuanced of account of PREVENT must consider the contested empirical reality of 
counter-terrorism governance.21 Doing so helps move beyond concretised versions of 
governmentality which, Bevir (2011: 462) notes, ‘rarely examine agency as a source of 
discourses or as evidenced in specific instances of counter power’. 
Yet there is more to the CTSA than this epistemological characterisation. Because 
political rationalities are concerned both with framing a social problem as in need of 
rectification and providing a governmental framework through which it can be addressed, 
‘they have a characteristically moral form’ (Rose and Miller, 1992: 226). As Rose and Miller 
succinctly put it, political rationalities are concerned with ‘the formulation and justification of 
idealised schemata for representing reality, analysing it, and rectifying it’ (Rose and Miller, 
1992: 178; emphasis added). This concerns the ‘fitting powers’ and ‘duties’ between a diverse 
range of authorities (Rose and Miller, 1992: 276). Within this, ‘moral form’ considers ‘the 
ideals or principles to which government should be directed’ (Stockdale, 2014: 178-9, 100-
101). In considering the moral characterisation of political rationalities, Foucault’s later 
analysis of thinking as a situated practice of critical reflection is instructive. Drawing upon 
Foucault, Collier outlines critical reflection establishes a certain distance from existing forms 
of acting and understanding and ‘works to remediate and recombine these forms’ (2009: 80). 
Discussing the effects driving new topologies of power, Foucault draws attention to thinking 
as a response to situated problems (Collier, 2009). Importantly, such occurrences are situated 
amid upheaval, in sites of problematisation in which existing forms have lost their coherence 
and their purchase in addressing present problems, and in which ‘new forms of understanding 
and acting have to be invented’ (Collier, 2009: 95). Mitchell Dean refers to this as the 
‘utopian element’ of governing (2010: 38).  
                                                 
20 On this argument, Miller and Rose contend mechanisms of security are realised through ‘a 
functioning network’ made up of ‘delicate affiliations’ (1990: 9-10). Nevertheless, to emphasise the 
relations between these elements, I maintain the term ‘assemblage’ as relevant.  
21 Commenting on the heterogeneity of authorities, Rose draws attention to the ‘conflicts’ between 
them (1999a: 21).  
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The strategic logic and ontology of PREVENT can be framed as ‘critical analysis in 
which one tries to see how the different solutions to a problem have been constructed’ 
(Foucault, 1997: 284). The most prominent criticism levelled at PREVENT concerns 
‘Othersing’ practices of surveillance (see Kundnani, 2009; Durodie, 2016). Framed as a 
political rationality, the CTSA can be read as a moral endeavour which distances PREVENT 
from socio-demographic profiling and fixed indicators which pre-figure terrorism. Under a 
safeguarding logic, PREVENT abandons linear, ‘conveyor belt’ factors leading to terrorist 
involvement (see HM Government, 2018a: 32). Revised advice from the DfE clearly outlines: 
‘there is no single way of identifying an individual who is likely to be susceptible to a terrorist 
ideology. As with managing other safeguarding risks, staff should be alert to changes in 
children’s behaviour which could indicate that they may be in need of help or protection’ 
(DfE, 2015: 6). Rather, the PREVENT Duty builds on ‘forms of professional intuition 
developed in safeguarding practice’ (Heath-Kelly and Strausz, 2018: 42). Professional 
practitioners are subsequently encouraged to use their ‘professional judgement’ in identifying 
‘at risk’ individuals (DfE, 2015: 6). It would seem the detection of radicalisation has become 
guided by the principles of intuitive professional expertise.  
This maps comfortably to the notion of political rationality, specifically, the critical 
exercise of power by experts. As Merlingen (2011: 155) highlights ‘expertise grounds 
governmentalities’. Moreover, a neoliberal notion of rationality emphasises self-determined 
decision-making that has crept into social responsibility arenas (Lemke, 2002). In the context 
of PREVENT, self-determined (intuitive) decision-making is far from concretised; 
precipitating factors for radicalisation have become arbitrary and capricious thus transforming 
the identification of behavioural signs towards a subjective realm. More than this, given the 
milieu of professional partners and reporting contexts, depoliticising counter-radicalisation as 
safeguarding serves a strategic purpose - that of operational linkage between and across 
diverse authorities.22 This fits Rose and Miller’s political rationality whereby ‘the problem 
                                                 
22 On this argument, I am interpreting depoliticisation as the altering of (political) decision-making 
rather than simply the denial of political choice.   
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was one of connecting [diverse agents] to the calculations and deliberations of other 
authorities (1992: 291; adapted by present author).  
Accordingly, it would seem the CTSA coincides with a re-reading of Foucault’s 
account of neoliberalism itself. Examining ‘advanced liberal government’ (rather than a 
generalised concern with neoliberal governmentality), Rose et al., (2006: 84) emphasise how 
projects of political rationalisation ‘are constantly undergoing modification in the face of 
some newly identified problem or solution’.23 Neoliberalism, according to Rose and Miller, 
‘should be seen as a re-organisation of political rationalities that brings them into a kind of 
alignment with contemporary technologies of government (1992: 296). Chorusing Rose et al., 
(2006), Collier argues neoliberalism is not a form of knowledge-power or a kind of 
governmentality that establishes the ‘conditions of possibility’ for thinking and acting in a 
certain way (2009: 99-100). For Collier, ‘it is a form of thinking, a kind of reflection that aims 
to critique and remediate existing mentalités and practices of government that have become 
uncertain or problematic’ (2009: 100; emphasis added). A political rationality thus 
‘problematises’ a certain aspect of the social world, and offers a programmatic and rhetorical 
framework through which ‘programmes of government’ can be developed in response to an 
identified problem (Stockdale, 2014: 181-2, 100). Much in the same way, the concept of 
problematisation helps unpack the intertwining of counter-radicalisation and social care. It is 
this concept the article now turns.   
 
Problematising PREVENT: Counter-Radicalisation Assemblage 
 
Rose and Miller (1992) state the ideals of government are a ‘problematising activity’. 
Problematisation is circulated around the ‘failings it seeks to rectify’ (Rose and Miller, 1992: 
279) and the resultant formation is a ‘complex assemblage’ between heterogeneous forces and 
diverse authorities (Rose and Miller, 1992: 281). An assemblage relates to alignments which 
                                                 
23 Foucault frames ‘problems’ or ‘solutions’ in response to ‘urgency’ and ‘crisis’, whereas Rose and 
Miller use the general term ‘problematic’. I do not submit that the implementation of the CTSA can be 
reduced to a single case of urgency or crisis.      
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are forged and the ‘the will to govern as a point of convergence and fracture’ (Li, 2007: 268). 
Li’s (2007) concept of ‘problematisation’ is particularly instructive when analysing how 
heterogeneous elements are ‘assembled and ordered to hold together and endure both across 
differences and through differences’ (Anderson et al., 2012: 177). For Li (2007), 
‘problematising’ is an important element in the assemblage, and analysis of ‘how problems 
come to be defined ... in relation to particular schemes of thought, diagnosis of deficiency and 
promises of improvement’ remains important, alongside questions of how knowledge is 
rendered technical and depoliticised; how alliances are forged, and how failures and 
contradictions are reincorporated into the assemblage (de Goede and Simon, 2013: 319). 
Central to this is the construction of knowledge which is rendered technical and depoliticised; 
and how problems become reproblematised (redefined).  
Similarly to the Nuansa training programme in the Netherlands,24 PREVENT 
encompasses a complex assemblage that does not definitively and coherently act but is rather 
a ‘generative flux of forces and relations that work to produce particular realities’ (Law, 2004: 
7). Recasting counter-radicalisation as safeguarding consolidates PREVENT as a ‘broad 
descriptor of different historical relations coming together, as an ethos oriented to the 
‘instability’ of interactions, and the potential for novelty and spatiotemporal difference, and as 
a concept for thinking the relations between stability and transformation in the production of 
the social’ (Anderson et al., 2012: 171-172, italics in original). In keeping with this 
theoretical framing, PREVENT can be read - not merely as the functional outcome of a social 
problem – but as a problematisation that is a contingent construction shaped by its ideational 
conditions of emergence (Merlingen, 2011: 153). 
                                                 
24 Nuansa is a knowledge-gathering group for frontline professionals involved in CoPPRa and 
RecoRa programmes in the Netherlands (see de Goede and Simon, 2013). RecoRa 
workshopped best practice amongst frontline professionals from the UK, the Netherlands, and 
Germany (de Goede and Simon, 2013). CoPPRa is a Belgian initiative that relates to the 
development of training materials for frontline practitioners to spot signs of radicalisation (de 
Goede and Simon, 2013).  
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Reflections on ‘assemblage’ are suggestive here. In discussing the internal dynamism of 
assemblages, the emphasis is squarely on bringing together the heterogeneous entities into 
some form of temporary relation (or set of relations) without presupposing that these relations 
necessarily constitute on organism (Anderson et al., 2012: 177). Anderson further delineates 
assemblage as both the ‘provisional holding together of a group of entities across differences 
and a continuous process of movement and transformation as relations and terms change’ 
(Anderson et al., 2012: 177). In the context of PREVENT, the term ‘provisional’ is crucial 
given the coherency within coalitions of (counter-terrorism) practice has been critically 
questioned (see O’Toole et al., 2015; Fussey, 2013; Dresser, 2015, 2018; Thomas, 2017).  
But how might heterogeneous entities converge? To put it differently, how do the 
heterogeneous elements that constitute an assemblage ‘function together?’ (Deleuze and 
Parnet, 1977: 39). For Deleuze (1992), the answer is found in the centrality of language and 
expression. This assertion finds support in work by Deleuze and Guattari (1987, [2004]: 407) 
who term assemblage a ‘constellation’ that can be divided on two axes. It is the second of 
these axes that is of concern to the current discussion: ‘enunciation’ (Deleuze and Guattari 
(1987: 81). Enunciation refers to a collection of languages, words and meanings; a provisional 
unity is produced through the ‘co-functioning’ of words (Deleuze and Parnet, 2006: 52, 
emphasis added). The article returns to this concept in the following section.  
While the notion of assemblage sheds light on the CTSA, there is a further dynamic to 
problematising PREVENT. The PREVENT Duty requires a pluralistic assemblage in which 
subsidiary authorities possess a significant degree of autonomy in terms of practically 
pursuing the objectives of PREVENT. Specified authorities ‘autonomatised’ through the 
CTSA are simultaneously ‘responsibilised’ to act in PREVENT’s name. The resultant 
formation is loose and flexible linkages between those who are ‘separated spatially and 
temporally, and between events in spheres that remain formally distinct and autonomous’ 
(Rose and Miller, 1992: 282). In different terms, while the CTSA acts as an overarching 
structure which guides the behaviour of responsibilised bodies, authorities possess a degree of 
autonomy through which the aims PREVENT are implemented. As the CTSA outlines, 
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specified authorities are expected to fully comply with the PREVENT Duty, however, how 
bodies participate is dependent upon a range of factors (HM Government, 2015b). This 
includes responding to a localised understanding of risk, rather than following the dictates of a 
central authority. The revised PREVENT Duty makes clear PREVENT is concerned with 
‘understanding, shared with partners, of the potential risk in the local area’ (HM Government, 
2015b: 10; emphasis added). Within this, police are said to galvanise local PREVENT 
partnerships alongside a ‘wide range of organisations to support local delivery of PREVENT 
(HM Government, 2015b 18; emphasis added). 
Training to recognise vulnerability similarly considers ‘local processes and policies’ 
that will enable staff ‘to make referrals to the CHANNEL programme’ (HM Government, 
2015b: 15). This may entail details of a police counter-terrorism local profile (CTLP) which 
outlines the threat, vulnerability and risk from extremist activity relating to terrorism within a 
specific area (HM Government, 2012b). To put this into context, research by Heath-Kelly and 
Strausz found ‘only 27% of NHS Trusts in PREVENT priority areas of England had 
integrated PREVENT into their Safeguarding policies, while 73% had stand-alone PREVENT 
policies’ (2018a: 33). They further found ‘four Mental Health Trusts (of 54 in England) 
currently include radicalisation criteria in their Comprehensive Risk Assessments for all 
service users’ (Heath-Kelly and Strausz, 2018a: 3). This adds a coercive element to 
governmental strategies that operate, as far as possible, ‘through’ rather than ‘against’ the 
desires and interests of their target population (Dean, 1999: 209).  
This, then, is not entirely governmentality. The notion of a highly centralised 
governmental apparatus where power is practiced as an antithesis of freedom and agency does 
not provide an adequately nuanced account of PREVENT (c.f. McKee, 2009; Stockdale, 
2014). While reconfiguring PREVENT as ‘safeguarding’ provides a set of consistent 
‘regularities’, how PREVENT is enacted is subject to contextual variation and local 
autonomy. This practical variation of PREVENT finds commonality with Rose and Miller’s 
conceptual account of political rationalities which ‘do not have the systematic and closed 
character of disciplined bodies of theoretical discourse’ (Rose and Miller, 1992: 178). While 
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political rationalities provide an operable pattern, the exercising of power by diverse 
authorities is subject to situational variance (Rose and Miller, 1992: 175). Rose and Miller 
(2008, 1992) further outline political rationalities render reality thinkable in such a way that it 
is amenable to political deliberations. ‘Problematisations of (potential) host societies provide 
an important input into these deliberations’ (Merlingen, 2011:157). The success of this 
depends on political rationalities and problematisations that frame their interests in a manner 
that resonates with members. This is because political rationalities are morally coloured, 
grounded upon knowledge, and made thinkable through language (Rose and Miller, 1992). 
The article now turns to towards theoretically exploring PREVENT as a technology of 
government with attentiveness directed towards the governance of PREVENT. 
 
Technologies of Government: Governing through Language 
 
In elucidating the problematics of government, Rose and Miller (1992) delineate the intricate 
inter-dependency between political rationalities and technologies of government (c.f. Miller 
and Rose, 1990). For Rose and Miller, it is through technologies of government that political 
rationalities become operable and thus capable of deployment. In the context of clarity, it is 
worth outlining the concept of technology. Drawing upon Foucault, Rose defines technology 
as: 
 ‘…Any assembly structure by a practical rationality governed by a more or less 
conscious goal. Human technologies are hybrid assemblages of knowledge, 
instruments, persons, systems of judgment, building and spaces, underpinned at 
the programmatic level by certain presuppositions about, and objectives for, 
human beings’ (Rose, 1996: 131-132).  
However, for now, I simply wish to highlight that governmental technologies entail the 
‘complex of mundane programmes, calculations, techniques, apparatuses, documents and 
procedures through which authorities seek to embody and give effect to governmental 
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ambitions’ (Rose and Miller, 1992: 273). Furthermore, in accounting for state transformations 
and policies, the ‘humble and mundane mechanisms by which authorities seek to instantiate 
government’ (Rose and Miller, 1992: 281) are intrinsically linked to developments in 
knowledge, powers of expertise, and the (re)configuration of sovereignty.  
Drawing upon the work of Burno Latour, Rose and Miller outline the concept of 
inscription devices which characterise the ‘material conditions which enable thought to work 
upon an object’ (Rose and Miller, 1992: 283). Inscription is said to be the means of acting 
upon the real - a way of ‘devising techniques for inscribing it in such a way as to make the 
domain in question susceptible to evaluation, calculation and intervention’ (Rose and Miller, 
1992: 283). Knowledge practices are thus inscribed in ‘centres of calculation’ that ‘are in the 
know about that which they seek to govern’ (Rose and Miller, 1992: 284; emphasis added). 
Authorities, in Rose and Miller’s terms, confer new visibilities of knowledge as centres of 
calculation. When connected together these components play a ‘decisive role within a 
programme of government that elevated a desire to know the nation and its subjects in fine 
detail into an essential resource of political rule’ (Rose and Miller, 1992: 285).  
Not merely a conflict resolution tool, the CTSA reconfigures PREVENT as a 
‘professional matter’ to be ‘resolved by the application of rational knowledge and 
professional expertise’ (Rose and Miller, 1992: 294). Importantly, however, the knowledge 
practices that cast identification of potential future radicals re-inscribe the imaginative 
geography of the individual at risk of radicalisation inside the spaces of everyday life 
(Amoore, 2009). The CTSA inaugurates authorities that already have extensive contact with 
public to statutorily operationalise counter-radicalisation as a pre-existing safeguarding 
measure. In the context of governance, the CTSA might be read as an attempt to 
(de)politically legitimise counter-radicalisation as it permeates the core of day-to-day 
actuarial practices of mundane social care environments. As the revised PREVENT guidance 
states, the PREVENT Duty does not ‘confer ‘new functions on any specified authority’ (HM 
Government 2015b: 2) but is expected to be incorporated into ‘existing policies and 
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procedures, so it becomes part of the day-to-day work of the authority’ (HM Government 
2015b: 6; emphasis added).  
Depoliticising ideological extremism within broader types of preventable abuse 
consolidates an overarching protectionist agenda intertwined with anticipatory security, 
particularly the deployment of ways of governing through uncertainty (O’Malley, 2004). This 
should, in theory, augment intelligence and information capture as it transforms the 
distinction between normality and exception. Moreover, this modifies an understanding of the 
relationship between politics, risk and sovereignty in ways similar to observations made by 
Aradau et al., (2008: 152) who state:  
‘The architecture of the normal takes shape through heterogeneous and 
mundane actuarial practices, through the arbitrary declarations of risky-ness 
and bureaucratic reallocation of power. The imperceptible and unknowable 
captured by technologies of risk are re-inscribed upon concrete everydayness, 
thereby colonising normality. Rather than the limit of normality, risk infuses 
exceptionalism within the governmentality of everydayness’.  
Similarly, governmentalisation of the state is said to legitimate and regulate at the same time 
(Rose and Miller, 1992). Rose and Miller make this clear in conceptualising governmental 
technologies as ‘mobile and ‘thixotropic’ associations (that) are established between a variety 
of agents, in which each seeks to enhance their powers by ‘translating’ the resources provided 
by the association so that they may function to their own advantage’ (Rose and Miller, 1992: 
282; adapted by present author). In light of this, Ragazzi draws attention to an ‘increased 
submission of social policy actors and their practices to the logics of security and social 
control’ (2017: 1). This poses two critical questions: ‘what lexicon is drawn on to make sense 
of the problem?’ (Merlingen, 2011: 152). And, ‘by means of what vocabulary do authorities 
frame reality in a way that makes it amenable to intervention?’ (Merlingen, 2011: 152). In 
answering such, it is not that mundane practices of social care have become transformed by 
the language and practice of security through PREVENT; rather, it is the reverse process 
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(Durodie, 2016). It is also not the case that language determines outcomes, but that inter-
subjective understandings formed through discursive practice delimit spaces for agency, and 
thus have a causal effect on what outcomes are possible (Fisher, 2012).  
Rose and Miller’s concept of ‘translation’ as a technology of government usefully 
captures moving from one condition to another through a revised composition of diversity. 
They summarise the notion of translation: ‘to the extent that actors have come to understand 
their situation according to a similar language and logic, to construe their goals and their fate 
as in some way inextricable, they are assembled into mobile and loosely affiliated networks’ 
(Rose and Miller, 1992: 282). Going back to counter-terrorism, as I found elsewhere (see 
Dresser, 2015), it was only after PREVENT police officers reconceptualised PREVENT as 
‘safeguarding’ that professional partners recognised their role in counter-radicalisation. Re-
orientating PREVENT towards an invocation of care was said to help embed partners’ 
expertise at local level (Dresser, 2015). In fact, for PREVENT police officers, terminology 
such as ‘PREVENT’ and ‘counter-terrorism’ were considered rather meaningless and counter-
productive (Dresser, 2015). On the other hand, safeguarding was embedded in the lexicon and 
day-to-day practice of key partners (Dresser, 2015). These findings fit with the concept of 
governmental technologies which are said to make other actors ‘accept its problematisation, 
goals and projects associated with it and that enable it to enrol them as allies’ (Merlingen, 
2011: 155; adapted by present author). In this vein, Rose and Miller suggest political 
discourse should be seen as an ‘intellectual machinery for rendering reality thinkable in such a 
way that it is amenable to political deliberations’ (1992: 277). Within this, common modes of 
perception are formed, in which certain events and entities come to be visualised ‘according 
to particular rhetorics of image or speech’ (Rose and Miller, 1992: 282).  
While language acts as a technology designed for shaping the conduct of governance, 
we must be wary of eagerly positing the resultant architecture embodies a stabilised network 
of power. This is particularly so given the contested nature of counter-terrorism governance. 
For instance, research by Heath-Kelly and Strausz (2018b) illuminates PREVENT’s imperfect 
fit with the NHS’ safeguarding infrastructure, with less than half of respondents agreeing that 
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PREVENT is a genuine safeguarding procedure. They also draw attention to how health care 
professionals renegotiated the provisions of the Care Act to appropriate the PREVENT Duty 
within health care settings. This was said to reduce professional dissonance given the 
inconsistencies between PREVENT and existing safeguarding structures (Heath Kelly and 
Strausz, 2018b).  
With this in mind, Rose and Miller suggest it is through political discourse that 
‘relations are established between the nature, character and causes of problems facing various 
individuals and groups – producers and shopkeepers, doctors and patients’ (Rose and Miller, 
1992: 282). Similarly, and in a Foucauldian sense, language helps embed expertise into multi-
agency counter-radicalisation whereby ‘behaviour is either normalised or pathologised by 
teachers, doctors and social workers who emerge as the new ‘judges of normality’’ (Foucault, 
1975: 304). However, unlike Foucault’s notion of disciplinary power, power in this sense is 
far more rhizomatic, and inscribed through mundane practices. This theoretical framing shares 
common ground with Home Office advice: 
‘Preventing someone from becoming a terrorist or from supporting terrorism is 
substantially comparable to safeguarding in other areas, including child abuse 
or domestic violence … The Department of Health has also supported the 
review of the ‘No Secrets’ guidance on safeguarding [vulnerable] adults. This 
will embed the principles of PREVENT within existing processes for 
safeguarding vulnerable adults and enable healthcare workers across the 
country to understand the parallels between PREVENT and existing support 
and intervention processes’ (HM Government, 2011a: 83–84; emphasis added).  
While Foucault’s aim was to ‘cut off the king’s head’ in political analysis, it is language 
which allows PREVENT to govern as a ‘headless body as if it indeed has a head’ (Dean, 
1994: 156). This is because language is not merely a justification, nor a semiotic proposition; 
language is a performative practice (Rose and Miller, 1992). The CTSA fuses specified 
authorities together through a (de)politicalised language of care. Central to this is a legislative 
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intersection between pastoral responsibility and security. As Rose and Miller observe: ‘the 
enactment of legislation is a powerful resource in the creation of centres, to the extent that law 
translates aspects of a governmental programme into mechanisms that establish, constrain, or 
empower certain agents or entities and set some of the key terms of their deliberations’ (1992: 
287).  
Rather than a focus on the ‘governing of conduct’, the CTSA can be read as 
‘conduct[ing] [of] government’; that is, technologies directed at improving governance 
(Wittendorp, 2016). Commenting on the ordering of counter-terrorism within the EU, 
Wittendorp (2016) draws attention to an ‘Anti-Terrorism Road Map’ which was subsequently 
revised as an ‘Action Plan’ following the 2004 Madrid bombings. The Action Plan - framed 
by Wittendorp as a governmental technology – included a list of measures designed to make 
the governing process more efficient (Wittendorp, 2016). This entailed collapsing several 
documents together to address the duplication of work. An additional function was that of 
monitoring the state of policy implementation (Wittendorp, 2016).  
The CSTA - as a legislative instrument - can similarly be framed as governmental 
technology which maintains overview as part of the governing process. The CTSA is attentive 
(and thus targets) the governing process itself, specifically, bringing the ‘present state of 
implementation’ in line with a ‘desired one’ (Wittendorp, 2016: 479-480). For example, 
section 32(A) of the CTSA allows the Secretary of State to enforce the performance of 
PREVENT when any specified authority has failed to execute its PREVENT Duty. Likewise, 
the Strategic Policing Requirement monitors police forces’ contribution to the PREVENT 
Duty, with the Home Secretary able to direct a Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) to take 
specific action to address any specific failure in relation to PREVENT (HM Government 
2016: 20). In the context of education, any school and college unable to satisfy the 
PREVENT(ive) requirements enforced by the Office for Standards in Education may be 
subject to intervention or find themselves the subject of a termination in funding. Within 
health settings, local safeguarding forums - including local commissioners and providers of 
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NHS Services - oversee the fulfilling the PREVENT Duty and are said to ensure effective 
delivery (HM Government, 2015a). 
This coincides with Rose and Miller’s conceptualisation of governance as ‘a 
congenitally failing operation: the sublime image of a perfect regulatory machine is internal to 
the mind of the programmers’ (1992: 190). Legislatively reconfiguring PREVENT as 
safeguarding depolitically legitimises PREVENT within social care environments, however, 
this runs parallel to bureaucratic managerialism which has become manifest in UK counter-
terrorism. It is therefore unsurprising that since the implementation of the CTSA, PREVENT 
reports and referrals have increased (see HM Government, 2017 and 2018b). Whether this 
demonstrates “effective” counter-radicalisation or a ‘culture of compliance’ (McGovern, 
2016) is unclear. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Inspired by Rose and Miller’s theoretical frame, an argument has been presented using 
political philosophy to contextualise PREVENT as having undergone a process of 
rectification; this entails the reconfiguration of PREVENT towards safeguarding. Of 
particular interest has been the CTSA which, as highlighted, collapses PREVENT into a pre-
existing safeguarding apparatus. To understand the resultant formation, this article has drawn 
attention to three key areas of analysis: ‘political rationalities’, ‘problematisations’, and 
‘technologies of government’. This political matrix should not be considered outside one 
another; rather, power operates in and through these concepts and thus, it is the connections 
between these dimensions that political discourse is circumscribed and reiterated (Foucault, 
2007). 
While the CTSA demonstrates a politics of government encompassing rationalities, 
problematisations, and technologies, it is intimately connected to contingent processes of 
governance. In an attempt to move beyond reified critiques of PREVENT centred around 
internal practices of surveillance and ‘Otherising’, this article has travelled a path less taken 
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and considered the material practices of governing. As argued, the original genealogy of 
governmentality demonstrates theoretical limitations, namely, the ‘fundamental inability to 
account for why the governance subject, constituted through discourse, fails to turn up in 
practice’ (McKee, 2009: 473-474). Thus, a concretised reading of governmentality as 
disciplinary regulation does not provide an adequately nuanced account of PREVENT for two 
reasons. First, it would be fallacy to disregard the degree of local autonomy specified 
authorities possess in the context in implementing the PREVENT Duty. While the CTSA 
provides an ‘operable pattern’ of governance, how diverse authorities carry out the 
PREVENT Duty is subject to situational variance. Second, the concept of resistance must be 
considered given the messy actualities of PREVENT in situ (O’Toole et al., 2016; Thomas, 
2017; Dudenhoefer, 2018; Dresser, 2015, 2018). As this article has argued, the domains of 
governance are inherently political involving ‘conflicts over definition’ and whereby ‘[the] 
implementation of public policies are struggled over by political professionals’ (Swarz, 2003: 
151, adapted by present author). How structure and agency operate and relate within this 
context is therefore analytically important. Political analysis navigates this conundrum as it 
helps illuminate ‘bureaucratic struggles, forms of symbolic competition, as well as how 
categories of suspicion, established in official policy documents, become translated, enacted 
and re-appropriated in local contexts by street-level bureaucrats’ (Lipsky, 1980 cited in 
Regazzi, 2016: 8-9).   
This article has also explored the construction of knowledge which is rendered 
technical and (de)politicised, as well as how problems become reproblematised within the 
micro-practices of everydayness. Through the CTSA, the production of ‘at risk’ subjectivities 
are shaped by, though not limited to, psychology, psychiatry and pedagogy (Rose, 1999b). In 
considering this, the language and practice of security have been transformed by mundane, 
actuarial practices of social care rather than vice versa. The centrality of language plays an 
important role as the revised ‘politico-ethical aspirations’ of PREVENT are enacted (Rose 
and Miller, 1992: 294). The resultant assemblage is a provisional unity produced through a 
(hoped for) co-functioning of words.  
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The primary messages contained in this paper should be of interest to a wide audience 
given the burgeoning body of actors tasked with counter-radicalisation on the ground. It is 
hoped the arguments presented provide a novel perspective of counter-radicalisation in ways 
which allow further analytical arguments and/or debates to emerge. Moving forward, it is 
important that scholars critically consider the fusing of disparate actors within a complex, 
ever-shifting counter-radicalisation assemblage; actors who arguably have no more unity than 
the fact that government policy has stitched them together. In considering PREVENT, it 
would be fruitful for future research to explore the ways counter-radicalisation is actualised, 
implemented and performed. Doing so will help a more nuanced account of PREVENT to be 
realised.             
 To finish, Rose and Miller modestly conceded their political analysis was preliminary; 
nevertheless, an attempt has been made to extend their analytical frame as an explanatory 
mechanism applied to pre-emptive security. While the primary messages of this article are 
similarly conceptual in nature, they provide a reconstituted understanding of PREVENT 
through a critical examination of the intertwining of social care structures and counter-
radicalisation. 
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